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CHAPTER 11 BANKRUPTCY AND CRAMDOWNS: 
ADOPTING A CONTRACT RATE APPROACH 
Daniel R. Wong 
ABSTRACT—One of the key issues in many Chapter 11 bankruptcy 
proceedings is the determination of a proper interest rate that debtors must 
pay on secured claims existing at the time of a bankruptcy reorganization. 
For decades, the courts of appeals have debated the proper cramdown 
determination approach. In Till v. SCS Credit Corp., the Supreme Court 
addressed the issue in a Chapter 13 context and produced a plurality 
opinion endorsing a formula approach. However, there is not yet a 
consensus for Chapter 11 cases. This Comment argues for the adoption of a 
“contract rate” approach whereby courts will default to the prepetition 
contract rate of the secured claim. I believe this method adequately protects 
the creditor’s lending expectations while also helping to limit the debtor-in-
possession’s evidentiary costs. Unlike the other approaches, the contract 
rate approach is more objective; courts will no longer have to consider 
evidential material to make a determination of the appropriate risk 
premiums or the existence of an “efficient market.” More importantly, the 
contract rate approach will provide predictability and greater fairness by 
ensuring that similar cases are treated alike. Overall, the ease, simplicity, 
and fairness of the contract rate approach make it a better option. 
 
AUTHOR—J.D., Northwestern University School of Law, 2012; B.S., 
Accounting, University of Southern California, 2006. I would like to thank 
Professor Allan Horwich, Judge Alan Ahart, and Deborah Chang for their 
insightful comments and suggestions on this Comment; the editors of the 
Northwestern University Law Review for their tireless editorial work; and 
Edie Oung for her amazing support, love, and encouragement throughout 
the entire process. 
N O R T H W E S T E R N  U N I V E R S I T Y  L A W  R E V I E W 
 1928 
 
INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................................... 1928 
I. LEGAL BACKGROUND OF CHAPTER 11 BANKRUPTCY .......................................... 1931 
II. CRAMDOWN INTEREST RATE AND METHODS OF CRAMDOWN DETERMINATION ... 1932 
A. Formula Approach .................................................................................... 1935 
B. Coerced Loan Approach ........................................................................... 1936 
C. Presumptive Contract Approach ............................................................... 1938 
D. Cost-of-Funds Approach ........................................................................... 1939 
III. TILL AND THE CRAMDOWN CONTROVERSY ......................................................... 1940 
A. The Value of Till ....................................................................................... 1941 
B. Plurality Opinion ...................................................................................... 1944 
C. Current Interpretation of Till .................................................................... 1946 
IV. THE EFFICIENT MARKET APPROACH ................................................................... 1947 
A. Defining an Efficient Market ..................................................................... 1948 
B. Debtor-in-Possession Financing ............................................................... 1949 
C. Concerns Regarding the Efficient Market Approach and  
 Debtor-in-Possession Financing ............................................................... 1950 
V. THE CONTRACT RATE APPROACH—A BETTER WAY .......................................... 1953 
A. Justified Expectations of the Parties ......................................................... 1954 
B. Underlying Policies and Interests of Bankruptcy ...................................... 1955 
C. Ease of Management, Uniformity, and Predictability ............................... 1956 
CONCLUSION .............................................................................................................. 1957 
INTRODUCTION 
Bankruptcy law in the United States offers benefits to both debtors and 
creditors. Debtors are able to exit bankruptcy with a fresh start, while 
creditors generally get at least a portion of their money back.1 Ideally, 
bankruptcy provides a quick and orderly forum for debtors to pay creditors 
 
1  See Saul P. Levmore, Fables, Sagas, and Laws, 33 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 485, 488–89 (1997) 
(describing the “fresh start” policy behind bankruptcy law); see also Williams v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 
236 U.S. 549, 554–55 (1915) (contending that the purpose of bankruptcy law is to provide the debtor 
with a fresh start); In re Sullivan, 195 B.R. 649, 654 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1996) (asserting that a “fresh 
start” for the debtor is “the essence of modern bankruptcy law” and one of its “primary purposes” 
(quoting In re Willis, 189 B.R. 203, 205 (Bankr. N.D. Okla. 1995))). Of course, this debtor-focused 
purpose is balanced against another important interest advanced by the bankruptcy system: providing 
recovery for creditors. See Michael Bentley Guss, Comment, Ohio v. Kovacs: The Conflict Between 
Federal Bankruptcy Laws and State Environmental Regulations, 34 AM. U. L. REV. 1263, 1269 (1985) 
(“[T]he creditors will receive at least part of the debt owed to them.”). 
So who can be a debtor in bankruptcy? Precedents reveal that debtors in bankruptcy include “mom 
and pop” businesses, movie and pop stars, politicians, airlines, large investment banks, car 
manufacturers, etc.—the list is endless. See, e.g., In re Tex. Rangers Baseball Partners, 434 B.R. 393 
(Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2010) (describing the bankruptcy filing of the owners of the Texas Rangers). 
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and resolve their debts. Yet, in reality, many bankruptcies are drawn into 
long and expensive litigation. One of the most frequently argued economic 
issues in bankruptcy court is the proper interest rate that debtors must pay 
on secured claims existing at the time of a bankruptcy reorganization.2 
When the parties to the bankruptcy proceeding fail to settle upon an interest 
rate, the bankruptcy judge must determine and calculate an appropriate 
cramdown interest rate. 
Due to the tremendous financial impact a cramdown can have on all 
parties, cramdown interest rates have become “one of the most litigated, 
contentious and costly squabbles in the bankruptcy arena.”3 The existence 
of cramdown interest rates stems from the bankruptcy court’s “cramdown” 
power, which is the court’s ability to confirm the reorganization plan 
proposed by a debtor-in-possession4 despite the objections of creditors.5 The 
judicial determination of this cramdown interest rate is often a decision that 
has significant financial ramifications both for the debtor-in-possession and 
for creditors.6 The cramdown interest rate may determine whether a 
reorganization plan is feasible, and it is certainly a key factor that secured 
creditors consider when deciding whether or not to accept a proposed 
reorganization plan. Yet, oddly enough, despite the large number of Chapter 
11 bankruptcies each year7 and the need for predictability and certainty, 
 
2  See Chaim J. Fortgang & Thomas Moers Mayer, Valuation in Bankruptcy, 32 UCLA L. REV. 
1061, 1119 (1985) (“Few bankruptcy issues have met with as much confusion as the determination of a 
proper discount rate.”). 
“[A] ‘secured claim’ is a right to payment that can be enforced either against property in which the 
debtor has an interest or against a claim of the debtor that is subject to setoff.” Eugene R. Wedoff, The 
Treatment of Claims in Consumer Bankruptcies 3 (1999), http://www.ilnb.uscourts.gov/Judge/Wedoff/
Outlines/Treatment_of_Claims.pdf. 
3  C.B. Reehl & Stephen P. Milner, Cram-Down Interest Rates: The Quest Continues, 30 CAL. 
BANKR. J. 15, 19 (2009); see Jason A. Pill, UnTill the Footnote Was Written: The Effect of Till v. SCS 
Credit Corporation on 11 U.S.C. § 1129(B)(2), 26 EMORY BANKR. DEV. J. 267, 268 (2010). 
4  Upon the filing of a voluntary petition for relief under Chapter 11 or, in the context of an 
involuntary case, upon the entry of an order for relief, the debtor automatically assumes an identity as 
“debtor in possession.” 11 U.S.C. § 1101(1) (2006). 
The debtor-in-possession keeps possession and control of its assets while undergoing reorganization 
under Chapter 11. Debtor-in-possession status ends when a plan of reorganization is confirmed, the 
bankruptcy case is dismissed or converted, or a Chapter 11 trustee is appointed. See § 1104(a) 
(describing the relatively limited circumstances in which a trustee may be appointed to manage the 
debtor’s affairs); §§ 1107–1108 (describing the rights and powers of the debtor-in-possession). 
5  Chapter 11 grants “cramdown” powers to the bankruptcy court. See § 1129(b)(1). 
6  See Monica Hartman, Comment, Selecting the Correct Cramdown Interest Rate in Chapter 11 and 
Chapter 13 Bankruptcies, 47 UCLA L. REV. 521, 522 (1999) (“The interest rate that debtors must pay 
on claims existing at the time of a bankruptcy reorganization is arguably the most debated economic 
issue in bankruptcy litigation.”). 
7  See Annual Business and Non-Business Filings by Year (1980-2011), AM. BANKR. INST., http://
www.abiworld.org/AM/AMTemplate.cfm?Section=Home&CONTENTID=65139&TEMPLATE=/CM/
ContentDisplay.cfm (last visited May 5, 2012) (presenting bankruptcy filing statistics from 1980 to 
2011). 
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bankruptcy courts continue to struggle with the proper determination of the 
cramdown interest rate a debtor-in-possession must pay on secured claims. 
For decades, the courts of appeals have debated the proper approach to 
determining cramdown rates.8 In Till v. SCS Credit Corp.,9 a 2004 case, the 
Supreme Court addressed the issue and produced a plurality opinion 
endorsing a formula approach.10 Yet because Till failed to produce a 
majority opinion and involved cramdown rates in the Chapter 13 context,11 
the extent of its precedential value in Chapter 11 cases is limited. 
Ultimately, Till has left practitioners and courts with little guidance as to the 
proper method of determining Chapter 11 cramdown interest rates.12 Recent 
developments suggest several cramdown approaches are being applied to 
Chapter 11 cases, such as the efficient market and formula approaches; 
however, none yet commands a clear consensus. 
After reviewing the various methods for determining cramdown rates, 
this Comment argues for the adoption of a contract rate approach. Under the 
contract rate approach, courts will default to the contract rate of the secured 
claim. This method will serve the interests of both the debtor-in-possession 
and the creditor better than the approaches that are currently being used 
because it adequately protects the creditor’s lending expectations while also 
helping to limit the debtor-in-possession’s evidentiary costs. Unlike the 
other approaches, the contract rate approach is objective; courts will no 
longer have to consider evidentiary material to make a determination of the 
appropriate risk premiums or the existence of an efficient market.13 More 
importantly, the contract rate approach will provide predictability and 
greater fairness by ensuring that similar cases are treated alike. Overall, the 
ease, simplicity, and fairness of the contract rate approach make it a better 
option. 
Part I reviews the legal background of the bankruptcy court and 
Chapter 11 bankruptcies. Part II discusses the importance of cramdown 
interest rates and examines the judicial approaches employed prior to Till. 
 
8  See April E. Kight, Recent Development, Balancing the Till: Finding the Appropriate Cram Down 
Rate in Bankruptcy Reorganizations After Till v. SCS Credit Corporation, 83 N.C. L. REV. 1015, 1015 
(2005). 
9  541 U.S. 465 (2004). 
10  See infra Part III. 
11  Unless otherwise indicated, all code, chapter, section, and rule references are to the Bankruptcy 
Code, 11 U.S.C. §§ 101–1532 (2006), and the FED. R. BANKR. P. 1001–9037. 
12  A Chapter 11 debtor may also be an individual and not necessarily a corporation. However, for 
the purposes of this Comment, I will narrow the scope of Chapter 11 debtors to corporations or other 
business entities. In the Chapter 11 individual-debtor context, it may make sense for the courts to follow 
the approach adopted by Till’s plurality. The rationale for this lies in the inherent differences between 
individuals and corporations. 
13  For examples of the efficient market approach (and its concomitant interpretive difficulties), see 
Bank of Montreal v. Official Comm. Of Unsecured Creditors (In re Am. Homepatient, Inc.), 420 F.3d 
559 (6th Cir. 2005), and In re Nw. Timberline Enters., Inc., 348 B.R. 412 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2006). 
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Part III analyzes the cramdown controversy and the impact of Till on 
Chapter 11 cases. It also discusses the precedential value of Till and 
concludes that it is instructive for Chapter 11 bankruptcies but not binding 
on lower courts. Part IV examines the efficient market approach and its 
connection with debtor-in-possession financing. It explains why and 
concludes that debtor-in-possession financing cannot equate to an “efficient 
market” for cramdown purposes. Finally, Part V proposes the contract rate 
approach for determining cramdown interest rates in Chapter 11 
bankruptcies. It explains why a contract rate approach is preferable to other 
approaches that courts have adopted. 
I. LEGAL BACKGROUND OF CHAPTER 11 BANKRUPTCY 
Pursuant to its constitutional power “[t]o establish . . . uniform Laws 
on the subject of Bankruptcies throughout the United States,” Congress has 
established a federal bankruptcy system.14 Although a negative stigma has 
been attached to bankruptcy, the current American bankruptcy system 
offers benefits to both debtors and creditors by offering relief to debtors 
while protecting the interest of creditors. 
In 1978, Congress passed the Bankruptcy Reform Act,15 a 
comprehensive piece of bankruptcy legislation that continues to serve as the 
uniform federal law governing all bankruptcy cases in the United States. 
One of the most notable features of the 1978 Bankruptcy Reform Act was 
the creation of a strong business reorganization section in Chapter 11 that 
dealt with how businesses file a bankruptcy petition and reorganize. 
The goal of any Chapter 11 bankruptcy is to “strike a balance between 
the need of a corporate debtor in financial hardship to be made 
economically sound and the desire to preserve creditors’ and stockholders’ 
existing legal rights to the greatest extent possible.”16 In effect, a Chapter 11 
bankruptcy embodies a policy that favors enabling “a debtor to continue to 
operate and to reorganize or sell its business as a going concern rather than 
simply to liquidate a troubled business.”17 It is thought that continuing to 
 
14  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4. 
15  Pub. L. No. 95-598, § 402, 92 Stat. 2549, 2682 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 11 
and 28 U.S.C.). 
16  See 7 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 1100.01, at 1100-4 (Alan N. Resnick & Henry J. Sommer 
eds., 16th ed. 2009); see also Edward H. Levi & James Wm. Moore, Bankruptcy and Reorganization: A 
Survey of Changes. III, 5 U. CHI. L. REV. 398, 405 (1938) (“The problem of reorganization is primarily a 
problem of how a failing debtor may be made economically sound and at the same time the rights, 
insofar as they exist, of the creditors and stockholders be preserved under a fair arrangement.”). 
17  7 COLLIER, supra note 16. By comparison, in Chapter 7 bankruptcy, the business ceases 
operations and a trustee is appointed to sell all of its assets. The proceeds are then distributed to its 
creditors with any residual amount returned to shareholders and owners. See 6 COLLIER, supra note 16, 
¶ 700.01 (2010). 
Under Chapter 11 bankruptcy, the debtor remains in control of day-to-day business operations as a 
debtor-in-possession and files a repayment plan with the bankruptcy court. A debtor-in-possession is 
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operate can generate greater value than liquidating the company.18 The 
bankrupt company hopes to emerge from bankruptcy with a new capital 
structure that will put behind it the economic woes that brought the 
company into bankruptcy in the first place. 
Under Chapter 11, a debtor-in-possession must file a repayment plan 
with the bankruptcy court and solicit creditors for acceptance and 
confirmation.19 If the court accepts and confirms the plan, the debtor will 
continue to operate and pay its debts under the terms of the repayment plan. 
In many instances, however, reorganizations will not proceed so smoothly 
due to creditors’ refusal to assent to the repayment plan. Congress, in 
drafting the Bankruptcy Code, anticipated this issue and created § 1129(b) 
to allow nonconsensual confirmation of a repayment plan. If the 
requirements of § 1129(b) are met, the court can confirm the plan despite 
creditors’ objections; essentially, the repayment plan is “crammed down” 
upon the nonassenting creditors.20 
II. CRAMDOWN INTEREST RATE AND METHODS OF CRAMDOWN 
DETERMINATION 
“Cramdown” is a bankruptcy term used to describe the judicial power 
to confirm or modify a plan against the wishes of certain classes of interest 
or claim holders.21 It is a powerful tool that allows the bankruptcy court to 
force dissenting classes of creditors, including those with both secured and 
unsecured claims, to accept the plan. Under a cramdown, the “dissenting 
classes are compelled to rely on difficult judicial valuations, judgments, and 
 
offered considerable discretion regarding the business’ operation, constrained generally only by the 
business judgment rule. See 11 U.S.C. § 1107‒1108 (2006) (establishing that a debtor is given the rights 
and powers of a Chapter 11 trustee). In the plan process, creditors may propose their own bankruptcy 
plan once the debtor’s exclusivity period has expired. See § 1121(c); discussion infra Part II. 
18  7 COLLIER, supra note 16 (“Continued operation may enable the debtor to preserve any positive 
difference between the going concern value of the business and the liquidation value.”). 
19  See § 1129(a). The debtor-in-possession must also satisfy certain requirements regarding the 
repayment plan itself (e.g., priority of certain creditors). 
20  Courts use “cramdown,” “cram down” and “cram-down” interchangeably. See In re Shat, 424 
B.R. 854, 858 n.7 (Bankr. D. Nev. 2010). Although this section discusses the cramdown provision of 
Chapter 11, the language of other cramdown provisions, such as the cramdown provision in Chapter 13 
scenarios, are essentially the same. Some courts have held that the reasoning regarding the determination 
of cramdown interest rates in one Chapter’s cramdown is applicable to other Chapters as well. 
Nonetheless, the Supreme Court has been silent on this issue. See Till v. SCS Credit Corp., 541 U.S. 465 
(2004). 
21  See David G. Epstein, Don’t Go and Do Something Rash About Cram Down Interest Rates, 
49 ALA. L. REV. 435, 438 (1998); Bruce A. Markell, Clueless on Classification: Toward Removing 
Artificial Limits on Chapter 11 Claim Classification, 11 BANKR. DEV. J. 1, 2 (1995). 
Note that certain provisions must be satisfied before a bankruptcy judge is allowed to apply a 
cramdown. 
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determinations.”22 However, to protect the interests of dissenting classes, 
§ 1129(b) provides that the bankruptcy court must determine that the 
repayment plan is “fair and equitable” and not unfairly discriminatory to 
dissenting classes of creditors.23 
To find a repayment plan fair and equitable, the bankruptcy court must 
ensure that the repayment plan accommodates secured creditors in one of 
three ways under § 1129(b)(2)(A).24 The first possibility is that the plan 
proponent, usually the debtor-in-possession, may surrender the secured 
property by selling the property free of the lien and transferring the 
proceeds of the sale to the lien holder.25 Another way to satisfy the fair-and-
equitable requirement is by allowing the debtor-in-possession or plan 
proponent to give the creditor an “indubitable equivalent” of its claim.26 
Finally, under § 1129(b)(2)(A)(i), the plan proponent may seek to satisfy 
the claim in full by issuing the secured creditor a new secured note payable 
over a period of years, with interest, rather than a single payment on the 
effective date of the plan.27 Unlike the other two options, this last option is 
the only one that results in the creditor’s continued involvement with the 
company throughout the reorganization plan. And it has been the subject of 
much litigation and debate. 
Under § 1129(b)(2)(A)(i), the plan proponent has the ability to 
essentially write a new loan for its secured creditors. According to the 
statute, the holder of a claim retains the lien on the property, but must 
receive “deferred cash payments totaling at least the allowed amount of 
such claim, of a value, as of the effective date of the plan, of at least the 
value of such holder’s interest in the estate’s interest in such property.”28 In 
other words, the bankruptcy plan must provide for the creditor to receive 
interest, as well as cash equivalent to the value of the collateral securing the 
creditor’s interest, as part of the future stream of payments. In 1988, the 
Supreme Court noted in United Savings Ass’n v. Timbers of Inwood Forest 
 
22  In re 500 Fifth Ave. Assocs., 148 B.R. 1010, 1020 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1993) (quoting In re 266 
Wash. Assocs., 141 B.R. 275, 287 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1992)). Bankruptcy valuation disputes generally 
occur over the valuation of debtor’s assets or the secured creditor’s collateral, which determines what 
portion of a creditor’s claim will be secured rather than unsecured. See § 506 (discussing the role of 
valuation in bankruptcy). 
23  The primary focus under § 1129(b) is a repayment plan that embodies fairness and equity for 
dissenting secured creditors. See § 1129(b)(1). The bankruptcy judge is given discretion in evaluating 
the debtor’s proposed use of the property, offer of adequate protection of the creditors, proposed 
borrowing, and any other business decisions under the business judgment rule. See § 363. 
24  Any one of the three methods will satisfy the fair-and-equitable requirement for secured creditors. 
See Arnold & Baker Farms v. United States (In re Arnold & Baker Farms), 85 F.3d 1415, 1420 (9th Cir. 
1996); Wade v. Bradford, 39 F.3d 1126, 1129 (10th Cir. 1994). 
25  See 7 COLLIER, supra note 16, ¶ 1129.04[2][b], at 1129-125 to -127 (2012). 
26  See id. ¶ 1129.04[2][c], at 1129-127 to -138.1. 
27  See id. ¶ 1129.04[2], at 1129-120 (stating that the debtor “may satisfy the claim in full by giving 
the creditor a note in the amount of the secured claim secured by the same collateral”). 
28  § 1129(b)(2)(A)(i)(II). 
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Associates, Ltd. that the “value, as of the effective date of the plan” 
language in the cramdown provision requires a present value analysis.29 
Under a present value analysis, the bankruptcy court must ensure that 
the total stream of payments—or “deferred cash payments,” in the words of 
the statute30—is set at a level sufficient to ensure the creditor receives the 
present value of its secured claim, even though it will receive that value 
over time. The deferred cash payments are discounted back to the present 
value of the claim at confirmation to ensure that the creditor receives 
disbursements of which the total present value equals or exceeds the 
amount of the secured claim.31 To accomplish this, the deferred cash 
payments must include an interest rate, or “discount rate,” which 
appropriately compensates the secured creditor for the fact that the value of 
its claim will be received over time rather than immediately. 
For example, a creditor may have a claim of $50 secured by collateral 
of equal value. Common sense dictates that $50 today is worth more than 
$50 paid over a span of seven years; this is the reason why loans often 
require interest payments in addition to payments of principal. In sum, the 
$50 is reduced by inflation, risk, and the loss of opportunity to invest the 
money elsewhere.32 
To compensate the creditor for the time value of money that is lost by 
the deferred repayment process, the bankruptcy courts apply an interest rate 
to the debtor-in-possession’s deferred payments to creditors. However, the 
proper way to determine an appropriate interest rate has been the subject of 
much debate. 
Although the Supreme Court has acknowledged the need to apply an 
interest rate to deferred payments to cramdown creditors,33 it has not yet 
ruled on an appropriate method of determining an interest rate for Chapter 
11 cramdown situations. The Bankruptcy Code is also silent on this issue. 
As a result, courts have endorsed a variety of approaches to determining the 
appropriate interest rate in Chapter 11 cramdowns.34 Courts have used many 
different types of rates and methods to obtain rates, but there is not yet a 
definitive answer. The next section discusses four different approaches that 
have emerged over the years. These four approaches—each with its own 
 
29  484 U.S. 365, 377 (1988). The present value analysis ensures that the creditor receives an amount 
that equals or is greater than the present value of the collateral at the confirmation date. 
30  § 1129(b)(2)(A)(i)(II). 
31  Rake v. Wade, 508 U.S. 464, 472 n.8 (1993). 
32  See 2 GRANT GILMORE & DAVID GRAY CARLSON, GILMORE AND CARLSON ON SECURED 
LENDING: CLAIMS IN BANKRUPTCY § 31.03 (2d ed. 2000). 
33  See Till v. SCS Credit Corp., 541 U.S. 465, 469 (2004); Rake, 508 U.S. at 465–66. 
34  See Bruce H. White & William L. Medford, Finding the Proper Chapter 11 Cramdown Rate of 
Interest: Pick Your Experts Carefully, AM. BANKR. INST. J., Dec./Jan. 2000, at 20 (discussing various 
methods used by the courts to establish an appropriate Chapter 11 cramdown interest rate or discount 
rate); see also 2 GILMORE & CARLSON, supra note 32 (noting there are at least forty-eight different 
approaches taken by courts). 
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advantages and weaknesses—are: (1) the formula approach, (2) the coerced 
loan approach, (3) the presumptive contract approach, and (4) the cost-of-
funds approach.35 
A. Formula Approach 
The formula approach requires a court to start with a base rate, such as 
the national prime rate,36 and then to increase it to account for any 
borrower-specific (or situation-specific) risk of nonpayment or default, 
typically between 1% and 3%.37 For example, a court applying the formula 
approach may accept a proposed cramdown interest rate of 8% if the plan 
proponent can establish a national prime rate of 6.2% and a reasonable risk-
adjustment rate of 1.8%. Most courts peg the base rate to the national prime 
rate of return.38 
Although supporters of the formula approach emphasize its objectivity 
and ease of use,39 many courts and commentators still question whether it 
adequately compensates creditors. Given the recent economic downturn, 
U.S. banks are tightening standards for lending.40 Borrowing has become 
more costly for both consumers and companies that are hoping to make it 
out of the recession.41 Under the formula approach, a debtor-in-possession 
has the opportunity “to refinance at a rate generally unobtainable by any 
like situated borrower.”42 Common borrowing practices dictate that a prime 
or risk-free rate is typically given only to the best borrowers; it does not 
 
35  See Bank of Montreal v. Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors (In re Am. Homepatient, Inc.), 
420 F.3d 559, 566 (6th Cir. 2005); In re Till, 301 F.3d 583, 589–93 (7th Cir. 2002). 
36  Till, 541 U.S. at 479 (“[T]he national prime rate . . . reflects the financial market’s estimate of the 
amount a commercial bank should charge a creditworthy commercial borrower . . . .”). Other possible 
base rates courts could choose—depending on the type of loan, its duration, and lender circumstances—
include LIBOR (London Interbank Offering Rate), Federal Home Loan Bank District Cost of Funds 
Index (COFI), and U.S. Treasuries. “Financial markets generally consider these to be ‘risk-free’ or 
nearly risk-free rates.” Ronald F. Greenspan & Cynthia Nelson, “UnTill” We Meet Again: Why the Till 
Decision Might Not Be the Last Word on Cramdown Interest Rates, AM. BANKR. INST. J., Dec./Jan. 
2005, at 48, 49. 
37  Till, 541 U.S. at 480. 
38  A prime rate of return is usually a reference to the interest rate used by banks. It is usually the rate 
of interest at which banks lend to preferred customers, such as those with strong credit histories. See 
Greenspan & Nelson, supra note 36, at 49 (defining the “national” prime rate, published by the Wall 
Street Journal, “as the base rate on corporate loans posted by at least 75 percent of the nation’s 30 
largest banks”). 
39  Courts can readily and objectively ascertain the national prime rate. See Till, 541 U.S. at 479. 
Beyond objectivity and simplicity, some supporters have argued that the formula approach instills 
predictability because risk-free interest rates tend not to fluctuate drastically and thus allow creditors to 
better establish contract rates and hedge any lending risks. 
40  See Dan Wilchins & Emily Kaiser, U.S. Banks Tighten Lending Standards, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 7, 
2008, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/01/17/business/worldbusiness/17iht-lend.4.9295180.html. 
41  See id. 
42  Michael Elson, Note, Say “Ahhh!”: A New Approach for Determining the Cram Down Interest 
Rate After Till v. SCS Credit, 27 CARDOZO L. REV. 1921, 1927 (2006). 
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follow that a bankrupt debtor-in-possession would (or should) be given that 
same rate. It is one thing for a bank that is in the business of lending to 
determine the interest rate, but it is another for a court to unsystematically 
establish one. Another concern that arises involves the determination of a 
risk premium. The formula approach takes into account the risk specific to 
each debtor-in-possession’s reorganization plan, but translating these risks 
into nominal percentages is certainly more of a subjective challenge than an 
objective one. 
B. Coerced Loan Approach 
Another approach endorsed by a number of courts is the coerced loan 
approach.43 Under this approach, the court sets the cramdown interest rate at 
the level the creditor would have obtained if it had “foreclosed [on the loan] 
and reinvested the proceeds in loans of equivalent duration and risk.”44 The 
bankruptcy court considers such factors as the payout period, the quality of 
the security, and the risk of future default.45 In addition, the coerced loan 
approach relies on evidence from actual credit markets. This approach 
attempts to put the creditors in the place they would have been in had they 
received the value of their claim and reloaned the funds in the open 
market.46 It assumes that the best way to determine the appropriate stream 
of future payments is by comparison to what the lender would charge in the 
open market for a loan of similar duration and risk as to the “new” post-
cramdown loan.47 
For example, assume that the debtor-in-possession borrows $1 million 
to buy an office building, with the building itself as collateral. Under the 
terms of the loan, the prepetition contract interest rate is 10%, whereas the 
postpetition comparable market rate is 14%. Subsequently, the debtor-in-
possession fails to make its loan payments and files for bankruptcy. Under a 
coerced loan approach, the bankruptcy court will force the debtor-in-
possession into a new loan of $1 million at a cramdown interest rate of 
14%, which is the rate for a comparable loan in the market. 
The coerced loan approach has several limited advantages. First, the 
coerced loan prevents the debtor-in-possession from obtaining the windfall 
 
43  See, e.g., GMAC v. Jones, 999 F.2d 63, 67 (3rd Cir. 1993); United States v. Arnold, 878 F.2d 
925, 930 (6th Cir. 1989); United States v. Neal Pharmacal Co., 789 F.2d 1283, 1289 (8th Cir. 1986); 
United States v. S. States Motor Inns, Inc. (In re S. States Motor Inns, Inc.), 709 F.2d 647, 653 (11th 
Cir. 1983); Memphis Bank & Trust Co. v. Whitman, 692 F.2d 427, 431 (6th Cir. 1982). 
44  Koopmans v. Farm Credit Servs. of Mid-Am., ACA, 102 F.3d 874, 875 (7th Cir. 1996) 
(discussing the coerced loan approach as one of multiple approaches to the cramdown subject). 
45  See Travelers Ins. Co. v. Bryson Props., XVIII (In re Bryson Props., XVIII), 961 F.2d 496, 500 
n.4 (4th Cir. 1992). 
46  See Thomas R. Fawkes & Steven M. Hartmann, Revisiting Till: Has a Consensus Emerged in 
Chapter 11s?, AM. BANKR. INST. J., Jul./Aug. 2008, at 28, 28. 
47  See id. 
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opportunities that the formula rate might give. The most obvious windfall is 
allowing the debtor-in-possession potentially to refinance at a lower interest 
rate than the current market or original contract rate, essentially rewarding 
him for entering bankruptcy. Second, the coerced loan approach protects the 
creditor’s expectations of lending in the open market. 
Yet the coerced loan approach is open to the criticism that no actual 
market exists for either the cramdown loan or a similar loan to a debtor-in-
possession. Several other concerns are raised in the criticism of the coerced 
loan approach.48 One is the lack of an equity cushion for the expected 
depreciation of the collateral. Lenders, when lending to a borrower, almost 
universally require some sort of equity cushion.49 However, in most 
cramdown situations, there is no equity cushion because the bankruptcy 
court forces the lender to make a new loan equal to the value of the 
collateral plus interest.50 The lack of any equity cushion exposes the creditor 
to an additional default risk. 
Even though there are primary and secondary lending markets for debt 
instruments created in Chapter 11 reorganizations that may yield reasonably 
accurate interest rates,51 there is also concern about whether an actual 
market can be replicated under the unique features of a Chapter 11 
bankruptcy.52 Certain costs, such as monitoring costs, are not incorporated 
into the actual markets the bankruptcy courts look to when determining an 
appropriate cramdown interest rate under the coerced loan theory.53 If a 
market does not exist for a particular loan, then “the policies behind 
reorganization are significantly impacted.”54 Critics of the coerced loan 
approach also argue that any market rate will include a lender’s profit 
margin, which is not part of the Bankruptcy Code’s definition of a 
 
48  See John K. Pearson et al., Ending the Judicial Snipe Hunt: The Search for the Cramdown 
Interest Rate, 4 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 35, 44‒47 (1996); see also Fleet Fin., Inc. v. Ivey (In re 
Ivey), 147 B.R. 109, 114‒16 (discussing the problems with the coerced loan approach). 
49  The debtor’s “equity” in property securing a debt is the amount by which the market value of the 
property exceeds the amount of the debt. An equity cushion exists when the debtor has sufficient equity 
in the collateral to protect against its depreciation and the accrual of interest and charges. For example, a 
debtor may place as collateral real property worth $55,000 for a $50,000 loan. However, secured claims 
in bankruptcy proceedings are often valued at a similar or the same value as the collateral and therefore 
lack an equity cushion. See 11 U.S.C. § 506(a) (2006); GMAC v. Jones, 999 F.2d 63, 68 (3rd Cir. 1993). 
50  See § 506(a). As under § 506(a), if a creditor’s claim is treated as a secured claim to the extent of 
the value of the estate’s interest in the property, by definition there is no equity cushion because no 
excess of the value of the property over the amount of the debt exists. 
51  Cf. Till v. SCS Credit Corp., 541 U.S. 465, 476 n.14 (2004) (noting that there are a number of 
commercial lenders’ websites that offer to loan to companies in Chapter 11 proceedings). 
52  For example, the loan may be too large and the market may have shrunk for loans of the type 
proposed. See 7 COLLIER, supra note 16, ¶ 1129.05[2][c][ii][B], at 1129-152. 
53  Other expenses can include U.S. Trustee expenses and Creditor of Committee expenses. See, e.g., 
8 id. ¶ 1302.05, at 1302-29 (2010). Chapter 13 reorganizations do typically require a trustee that 
monitors and controls the debtor’s assets. See id. ¶ 1302.03, at 1302-8 (2011). 
54  7 id. ¶ 1129.05[2][c][ii][B], at 1129-152 (2009). 
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creditor’s claim.55 This may overcompensate the lender at the expense of the 
debtor-in-possession.56 
C. Presumptive Contract Approach 
Rather than looking at the market rate, the presumptive contract 
approach requires a court to begin with the prepetition contract rate on the 
presumption that the prebankruptcy interest rate on the loan is an accurate 
reflection of the lending market.57 However, this presumption is rebuttable 
by either the secured creditor or the debtor-in-possession—who is unlikely 
to so rebut, given the likelihood that the cramdown is a product of the 
proposed plan—with persuasive evidence that a lower cramdown interest 
rate should apply based upon current market conditions or changes in the 
debtor-in-possession’s risk profile.58 However, the right to rebut the 
presumptive contract may be costly. “The debtor must obtain information 
about the creditor’s costs of overhead, financial circumstances, and lending 
practices to rebut the presumptive contract rate.”59 
For example, similar to the hypothetical in the coerced-loan-approach 
scenario, assume that the debtor-in-possession borrows $1 million to buy an 
office building, which will serve as collateral. Prebankruptcy, the parties 
agree to a long-term loan with a contract interest rate of 10%. Subsequently, 
the debtor-in-possession fails to make its loan payments and files for 
bankruptcy. Under the presumptive contract approach, the bankruptcy court 
will force the creditor into a new loan with a cramdown interest rate of 
10%, which is the original negotiated contract rate. 
The presumptive contract approach possesses certain advantages. The 
most obvious benefit is that the cramdown interest rate is predetermined by 
the contract creating the original loan. Courts find this cost-effective 
method for determining the cramdown interest rate particularly attractive in 
 
55  See Elson, supra note 42, at 1930. However, presumably, the original contract rate between the 
parties included a lender’s profit margin. Thus, one can argue that a creditor is not paid in full under a 
bankruptcy proceeding unless a lender’s profit margin is included. 
56  Reorganization plans are approved by the bankruptcy judge, who must consider the feasibility of 
the plan. 
57  See Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors v. Dow Corning Corp. (In re Dow Corning Corp.), 
456 F.3d 668, 679 (6th Cir. 2006) (“When a debtor is solvent, . . . the presumption is that a bankruptcy 
court’s role is merely to enforce the contractual rights of the parties, and the role that equitable 
principles play in the allocation of competing interest is significantly reduced.”). 
58  See Till v. SCS Credit Corp., 541 U.S. 465, 473 (2004) (“[T]he court remanded the case to the 
Bankruptcy Court to afford petitioners and respondent an opportunity to rebut the presumptive 21% 
rate.”); GMAC v. Jones, 999 F.2d 63, 71 (3rd Cir. 1993) (“[I]f a debtor proposes a plan with a rate less 
than the contract rate, it would be appropriate, in the absence of a stipulation, for a bankruptcy court to 
require the debtor to come forward with some evidence that the creditor’s current rate is less than the 
contract rate.”). 
59  Till, 541 U.S. at 478. A debtor seeking to rebut the presumptive contract rate may need to 
introduce expert testimony about the creditor’s financial condition, increasing the evidentiary burden on 
the debtor. 
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bankruptcy proceedings, where the debtor-in-possession has limited 
resources.60 Assuming there is no attempt to rebut the prepetition rate, the 
debtor-in-possession is able to save resources by avoiding the expense of 
discovery and evidentiary hearings.61 Second, the presumptive contract 
approach protects the justified expectations of both the creditor and the 
debtor-in-possession. By entering into the initial creditor–debtor 
relationship, both parties are given proper notice of their duties and 
obligations. It eliminates the subjective dimensions found in other 
approaches. 
However, like the other approaches, the presumptive contract approach 
has its deficiencies. For example, many courts face the question of whether 
they should cram down contractual subprime mortgage rates that are 
characterized as being higher than standard market interest rates.62 The 
interest rates charged on these subprime mortgages are so outrageously high 
that more often than not the debtor-in-possession is unable to satisfy its 
obligations.63 Critics also stress that the approach does not adequately take 
into consideration important differences between the actual lending market 
and the cramdown situation.64 
D. Cost-of-Funds Approach 
The cost-of-funds approach requires the court to set the cramdown 
interest rate at the rate another lender would charge the debtor to borrow an 
amount equal to the value of the secured claim.65 It is based on the 
 
60  See In re Till, 301 F.3d 583, 592 (7th Cir. 2002) (“The continuation of the old contract rate to the 
bankrupt debtor under the supervision of the bankruptcy court will . . . also result in some economies.”); 
Green Tree Fin. Servicing Corp. v. Smithwick (In re Smithwick), 121 F.3d 211, 214‒15 (5th Cir. 1997) 
(“Chapter 13 cases, because of the greater need to reduce litigation expenses associated with an 
individualized discount rate determination, call for particular guidance in the selection of the appropriate 
post-confirmation interest rate.”). 
61  See Smithwick, 121 F.3d at 214‒15 (noting that in Chapter 11 proceedings the interest rate 
determination requires expert testimony on valuation). 
62  See Household Auto. Fin. Corp. v. Burden (In re Kidd), 315 F.3d 671, 673–74 (6th Cir. 2003). 
63  See Raymond H. Brescia, Subprime Communities: Reverse Redlining, the Fair Housing Act and 
Emerging Issues in Litigation Regarding the Subprime Mortgage Crisis, 2 ALB. GOV’T L. REV. 164, 166 
(2009) (“[M]any subprime borrowers fall into delinquency and foreclosure, [and] since a 
disproportionate share of such loans were made in communities of color, a disproportionate share of the 
foreclosures will also fall on such communities.”). Subprime interest rates can be as high as 20.95%. See 
Kidd, 315 F.3d at 673 (“[S]ub-prime lenders generally charged higher rates of interest on their loans, 
ranging from 20.95% to 24.95% for automobile loans.”). Payday loans provide another example of high 
contractual interest rates. Payday loans are short-term cash advances secured by future paychecks. 
Typical rates for these loans range from 200% to 300%. Elizabeth R. Schiltz, The Amazing, Elastic, 
Ever-Expanding Exportation Doctrine and Its Effect on Predatory Lending Regulation, 88 MINN. L. 
REV. 518, 581 n.300 (2004). 
64  See Hartman, supra note 6, at 536–38. 
65  8 COLLIER, supra note 16, ¶ 1325.06[4]; Michael G. Williamson, Determining Cram Down 
Interest Rates Post-Till (Am. Bankr. Inst. 10th Annual Se. Bankr. Workshop, Kiawah Island Resort, 
S.C.), July 27–30, 2005, at 2, available at http://www.abiworld.org/committees/newsletters/financebank/
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assumption that the secured creditor will borrow new funds to replace the 
money tied up in the bankruptcy and that secured creditors have access to 
additional funding.66 A number of bankruptcy courts have adopted the cost–
of-funds approach,67 but no circuit court has yet implemented it.68 
The major difficulty associated with the cost-of-funds approach is its 
underlying assumption that the secured creditor has access to an unlimited 
supply of credit.69 With a limited amount of credit to draw on, “utilizing 
[the secured creditor’s] borrowing capacity without providing . . . the usual 
return on its capital produces a loss for the secured creditor.”70 The 
approach does not consider the administrative costs and normal profits from 
lending.71 
Another difficulty associated with the cost-of-funds approach is its 
failure to account for the risk of default.72 “[T]he focus is on the 
creditworthiness of the creditor, not the creditworthiness of the debtor.”73 In 
determining the proper cost-of-funds interest rate, the court will assess the 
creditor’s business structure, capital, operational efficiency, and credit 
history.74 An inefficient or poorly capitalized lender will generate a different 
cost-of-funds interest rate than a more efficient and better capitalized 
lender.75 This approach fails to reflect the debtor-in-possession’s status as a 
borrower; it further fails to consider the likelihood of a Chapter 11 debtor-
in-possession being more creditworthy—and therefore able to access 
money more cheaply—than the creditor is. For example, a lender with 
operational inefficiencies may charge higher interest to cover its losses. 
III. TILL AND THE CRAMDOWN CONTROVERSY 
Prior to 2004, courts applied a variety of methods in establishing the 
proper cramdown interest rate, including the four methods discussed 
 
vol2num1/cramdown.pdf; see GMAC v. Valenti (In re Valenti), 105 F.3d 55, 63 (2d Cir. 1997) (“[T]he 
‘cost of funds’ approach[] bases the market rate on the rate that the creditor itself pays when it borrows 
funds.”). 
66  See United Carolina Bank v. Hall, 993 F.2d 1126, 1130 (4th Cir. 1993). The formula approved in 
these cases can better be described as approximating the debtor’s cost of funds than as the secured 
creditor’s cost of funds. See GMAC v. Jones, 999 F.2d 63, 69 n.9 (3d Cir. 1993). 
67  See In re Jordan, 130 B.R. 185, 190 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1991); Elson, supra note 42, at 1933. 
68  Elson, supra note 42, at 1933; Williamson, supra note 65, at 2. 
69  See Epstein, supra note 21, at 450. 
70  United Carolina Bank, 993 F.2d at 1130; see Epstein, supra note 21, at 450. 
71  See Elson, supra note 42, at 1934. 
72  Epstein, supra note 21, at 450–51; see United Carolina Bank, 993 F.2d at 1130. 
73  Epstein, supra note 21, at 451. 
74  Id. 
75  Id. (“[A] cram down interest rate based on the cost of funds approach in essence rewards a lender 
for being inefficient or poorly capitalized. More efficient and better capitalized lenders will have lower 
costs of funds.”). 
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above.76 Consensus on which of these approaches should apply in a Chapter 
11 proceeding was a “distant reality.”77 However, in 2004, the Supreme 
Court addressed the important question of how to select an appropriate 
interest rate for cramdown situations in Till v. SCS Credit Corp.78 
In the case, Lee and Amy Till owned and operated a used pickup truck 
worth $4000 that was subject to a debt to SCS Credit Corporation (SCS).79 
The Tills had bought the truck just one year earlier, financing the purchase 
with a loan that had a “subprime” interest rate of 21% for 136 weeks. Under 
the contract, the Tills agreed to make 68 biweekly payments to cover the 
debt; if the Tills defaulted, SCS retained the right to repossess the truck.80 
Subsequently, the Tills filed for Chapter 13 bankruptcy and elected to 
pursue a “cramdown option.” Under the proposed Chapter 13 plan, the Tills 
would pay 9.5% interest on the secured portion of SCS’s claim, 
representing a 1.5% “risk adjustment” to the 8% national prime rate at the 
time.81 The bankruptcy court confirmed the plan’s 9.5% cramdown interest 
rate. On appeal, the district court reversed and held that the 21% 
“subprime” interest rate per the original contract was the proper rate. On a 
subsequent appeal, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals vacated the district 
court’s judgment and remanded, expressing the view that the contract’s 
21% interest ought to serve as the “presumptive” cramdown rate.82 The 
Supreme Court granted certiorari, reversed, and remanded the case back to 
the bankruptcy court.83 
A. The Value of Till 
In Till, the issue was how to establish a proper cramdown rate on a 
used truck in a Chapter 13 case.84 The decision in Till consisted of a four-
Justice plurality opinion,85 a concurring opinion,86 and a four-Justice 
dissenting opinion. Although there was no approach endorsed by a clear 
 
76  See Fawkes & Hartmann, supra note 46, at 28. 
77  Id. 
78  541 U.S. 465 (2004). 
79  Id. at 470. The Tills’ outstanding claim at the time of filing was $4894.89, but as agreed by the 
parties, the value of the truck securing the claim was only $4000. Id. 
80  Id. 
81  Id. at 471. 
82  Id. at 472‒73. 
83  Id. at 473, 485. 
84  Id. at 474‒75. 
85  Id. at 468. A plurality opinion is the controlling opinion when no majority opinion exists. It is 
written when a majority of judges agree on the outcome, but not on the reasoning behind that outcome. 
For example, in a twelve-member court, seven judges believe that the plaintiff should win a given case, 
but only four of them agree on the reasoning behind that decision. See Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 
188 (1977) (explaining how the holding of a case should be interpreted when there is only a plurality). 
86  Justice Thomas authored the lone concurrence. Till, 541 U.S. at 485 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
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majority of the Justices, five Justices rejected the presumptive contract 
approach for the Chapter 13 case.87 
In Till, Justice Stevens, announcing the judgment of the Court and the 
plurality opinion, accepted the formula approach as the ideal method of 
calculating an appropriate interest rate in Chapter 13 contexts.88 The 
plurality found the formula approach—in comparison to the other 
approaches—a “straightforward, familiar, and objective inquiry, [which] 
minimizes the need for potentially costly additional evidentiary 
proceedings.”89 Justice Thomas, concurring, agreed with the plurality that 
the use of the presumptive contract rate was inappropriate,90 but opted for a 
“risk-free” rate that did not include the risk-factor adjustment found in the 
plurality’s formula approach.91 He reasoned that the Bankruptcy Code only 
required a valuation of the property to be distributed under the plan, not the 
promise to pay pursuant to the plan.92 Thus, because the risk of default was 
not relevant in valuing the underlying property, the risk-free rate itself was 
enough to satisfy the Bankruptcy Code. 
The dissent, in an opinion by Justice Scalia, endorsed using the 
contract rate of the original agreement as a rebuttable presumption of (and 
proxy for) the market rate when determining the appropriate interest rate in 
cramdown situations in the absence of other evidence.93 The dissent favored 
using a contract rate based on the view that “lending markets are 
competitive”94 and that the contract rate yields the most accurate estimate of 
a market interest rate.95 In addition, the dissent agreed with the plurality on 
the need to compensate creditors for the increased risk of nonpayment and 
default once the debtor has entered bankruptcy. According to the dissent, 
relevant factors in determining the risk premium include: “(1) the 
 
87  Four Justices joined the plurality reasoning (formula approach), see id. at 468 (plurality opinion), 
and Justice Thomas endorsed a variant of the formula approach, id. at 491 (Thomas, J., concurring) 
(noting that the risk-free rate alone satisfies the statute’s textual requirement that the creditor receive the 
value of its claim, and that therefore the judgment of the circuit court should be reversed). 
88  Id. at 468, 479‒80 (plurality opinion). The plurality also found that debtors and creditors should 
be allowed to present evidence about the appropriate risk adjustments, with the evidentiary burden on 
the creditors (as information will be far more accessible to creditors than to individual debtors). Id. at 
484‒85. 
89  Id. at 479. 
90  Id. at 487 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
91  See id. at 486–91. 
92  Id. at 486. 
93  Id. at 492 (Scalia, J., dissenting). For example, a presumptive contract rate can be rebutted by 
evidence from the debtor showing the creditor’s rate on current lending is less than the contract rate. 
GMAC v. Jones, 999 F.2d 63, 70‒71 (3d Cir. 1993). 
As discussed above, rebutting a presumptive contract rate may be costly. The debtor must obtain 
evidence that includes, but may not be limited to, the creditor’s overhead costs, financial circumstances, 
and lending practices. See discussion supra Part II.C. 
94  Till, 541 U.S. at 492 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
95  See id. at 492–99. 
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probability of plan failure; (2) the rate of collateral depreciation; (3) the 
liquidity of the collateral market; and (4) the administrative expenses of 
enforcement.”96 
Although the case revolved around a Chapter 13 bankruptcy, much 
debate arose with respect to the application of Till outside of the Chapter 13 
context.97 Justice Stevens, speaking for the Till plurality, wrote, “We think it 
likely that Congress intended bankruptcy judges and trustees to follow 
essentially the same approach when choosing an appropriate interest rate 
under any of these provisions.”98 A plain interpretation of the statement 
would suggest that the formula approach should be used in Chapter 11 
scenarios too. However, in a later footnote, the Court appears to suggest 
that an “efficient market” approach would be preferred.99 The Court noted: 
Because every cramdown loan is imposed by a court over the objection of the 
secured creditor, there is no free market of willing cramdown lenders. 
Interestingly, the same is not true in the Chapter 11 context, as numerous 
lenders advertise financing for Chapter 11 debtors in possession. . . . Thus, 
when picking a cramdown rate in a Chapter 11 case, it might make sense to 
ask what rate an efficient market would produce.100 
The argument against according precedential effect to Till’s plurality 
opinion outside the Chapter 13 context is in its “substantial 
inconsistency”;101 as shown above, the plurality itself seems internally 
conflicted over the preferred approach in Chapter 11 conditions.102 
Another possible reason why Till is not binding on non-Chapter 13 
situations is that there are inherent differences between Chapter 11 and 
Chapter 13 bankruptcies. Failing businesses are hardly the same as private 
individuals failing with their personal financial affairs. Just to survive, 
private individuals may need to incur daily expenses on food, housing, 
health care, and many other personal care products.103 One might also worry 
over whether the individual is a sophisticated party who has the necessary 
resources to protect his or her bankruptcy rights.104 Chapter 13 is meant to 
 
96  Id. at 499. 
97  See, e.g., Bank of Montreal v. Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors (In re Am. Homepatient, 
Inc.), 420 F.3d 559, 566‒67 (6th Cir. 2005) (“[E]ven though the [Till] plurality is clear that the formula 
approach is the preferable method for Chapter 13 cases, the opinion is less clear about cases in the 
Chapter 11 context.”); In re Prussia Assocs., 322 B.R. 572, 585 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 2005) (opining that 
whether Till applies to Chapter 11 cases is “an undecided question”); see also Fawkes & Hartmann, 
supra note 46, at 28–29, 66 (discussing the effects of Till on subsequent Chapter 11 cases). 
98  Till, 541 U.S. at 474. 
99  Id. at 476 n.14. 
100  Id. 
101  Fawkes & Hartmann, supra note 46, at 28. 
102  See supra notes 98–100 and accompanying text. 
103  Cf. 11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(2) (2006) (summarizing the potential monthly expenses of a debtor). 
104  See Donald R. Lassman, Individual Chapter 11s Really Do Work: Practical Considerations for 
Small-Business Debtors, AM. BANKR. INST. J., Mar. 2008, at 18, 18 (“Because chapter 11 can be much 
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only protect insolvent individuals, whereas Chapter 11 filers are generally 
businesses.105 Both Chapter 13 and Chapter 11, like the Bankruptcy Code as 
a whole, advance the dual goals of providing debtor relief and satisfying 
creditors’ claims.106 The legislative history of Chapter 11 reveals no 
preference between the dual goals. However, the legislative history of 
Chapter 13 reveals “Congress’s goal of increasing the efficacy of the fresh 
start that bankruptcy provides individuals,” which suggests, in the context 
of Chapter 13 bankruptcies, that a debtor-in-possession’s fresh start might 
be more important than the rights of creditors.107 
It may also help to focus on the differences between individuals and 
businesses. Each are distinct legal entities and the Code itself acknowledges 
this through the creation of different bankruptcy provisions for each.108 The 
distinction between individuals and businesses is important because the 
impact of bankruptcy on a corporation is bound to differ in many respects 
from its impact on individuals.109 An approach that works for Chapter 13 
bankruptcies, such as the formula approach, might not necessarily work for 
Chapter 11 bankruptcies. Thus, courts are left with an opportunity to 
consider new approaches in regards to Chapter 11 bankruptcies. 
B. Plurality Opinion 
It is also important that Till’s ruling was based on a plurality opinion.110 
The force of a plurality decision generally depends on the level of 
agreement or disagreement exhibited by the various opinions issued.111 In 
 
more complex than chapter 13, assembling a team of professionals, particularly accounting professionals 
with chapter 11 experience, can be essential to success.”). 
105  Individuals who engage in business may also file for bankruptcy under Chapter 11. See 
2 COLLIER, supra note 16, ¶ 109.05[1], at 109-35 (2010). However, as noted above, the focus of this 
Comment is primarily on corporations and other business entities filing Chapter 11 bankruptcies. 
106  7 id. ¶ 1100.01; see also Carpenter v. Fanaras (In re Fanaras), 263 B.R. 655, 671 (Bankr. D. 
Mass. 2001) (“The twin goals of bankruptcy law [are] debtor relief and equitable distribution . . . .”); C. 
Scott Pryor, Revised Uniform Commercial Code Article 9: Impact in Bankruptcy, 7 AM. BANKR. INST. 
L. REV. 465, 514 (1999) (stating that the two co-equal goals of bankruptcy “are the collective 
enforcement of claims recognized by state law and the rehabilitation of the debtor”). 
107  Elson, supra note 42, at 1942. In the context of Chapter 13, there is legislative history to suggest 
a debtor-in-possession’s fresh start is more important than the rights of creditors. See 8 COLLIER, supra 
note 16, ¶ 1300.02 (citing H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, at 117 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 
6077–78). 
108  See Richard H.W. Maloy, Comparative Bankruptcy, 24 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT’L L. REV. 1, 10 
(2000) (“Although Chapter 11 is not restricted to business-debtors, business entities file under 
Chapter 11 far more frequently than individual debtors do. Adjustment of debts under Chapter 13 is 
limited to individuals.”); Mark A. Davis, Comment, Toibb v. Radloff: Chapter 11 Relief Now Available 
to Individual Debtors, 27 NEW ENG. L. REV. 693, 710 (1993) (“Given the complexities associated with a 
Chapter 11 petition, most individual debtors will seek relief under Chapter 7 or 13.”). 
109  See, e.g., discussion infra Part V.B. 
110  See Till v. SCS Credit Corp., 541 U.S. 465, 468 (2004). 
111  A plurality opinion is the opinion that received more support than any other in a situation in 
which no opinion commanded a majority. Plurality opinions present a precedential quagmire for lower 
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Marks v. United States, the Supreme Court explained how the holding of a 
case should be viewed where there is no majority supporting the rationale 
of any opinion.112 “When a fragmented Court decides a case and no single 
rationale explaining the result enjoys the assent of [the majority], ‘the 
holding of the Court may be viewed as that position taken by those 
Members who concurred in the judgments on the narrowest 
grounds . . . .’”113 
The lack of a majority rationale weakens the precedential effect of Till 
in non-Chapter 13 situations, especially because each opinion endorses a 
different method for determining interest rates. The narrowest interpretation 
is that the Supreme Court did not endorse the coerced loan approach for 
Chapter 13 debtors.114 There is, however, no indication that a majority of the 
Justices would agree on the cramdown interest rate approach in non-
Chapter 13 situations, such as a Chapter 11 bankruptcy. 
Only the plurality opinion explicitly discusses the applicability of Till 
to other provisions of the Bankruptcy Code.115 Justice Thomas’s 
concurrence and the dissent in Till are silent on the issue.116 Furthermore, 
Justice Thomas’s concurring opinion only focuses on what is necessary in a 
plan to satisfy § 1325(a)(5)(B)(ii); there is no mention of § 1129(b)(2) or 
Chapter 11 plans at all.117 
As such, Till leaves lower courts without any clear guidance as to 
which rule to apply in Chapter 11 cramdown cases.118 As there is no 
uniform holding with regard to Till’s applicability to non-Chapter 13 
provisions, Till, at most, is instructive. Lower courts are left free to reach 
their own conclusion as to the appropriate cramdown interest rate for 
Chapter 11 bankruptcies. Therefore, Till does not prevent courts from 
adopting the contract rate approach set forth in this Comment. 
 
federal courts. See generally Comment, Supreme Court No-Clear-Majority Decisions: A Study in Stare 
Decisis, 24 U. CHI. L. REV. 99 (1956) (analyzing the precedential problems posed by plurality opinions 
and classifying them based on their usefulness). 
112  430 U.S. 188, 193–94 (1977). 
113  Id. at 193 (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 169 n.15 (1976) (opinion of Stewart, Powell 
& Stevens, JJ.)). 
114  Till, 541 U.S. at 477. While no opinion commanded a majority of the Justices, neither the 
plurality nor the concurrence endorsed the coerced loan approach. See also Elson, supra note 42, at 
1934–39 (discussing the precedential value of the court’s holding in Till, and noting that “[t]he 
narrowest interpretation is that the Supreme Court did not endorse the Seventh Circuit’s ruling [favoring 
the coerced loan approach]”). 
115  See Till, 541 U.S. at 474–75. 
116  See id. at 485–508 (Thomas, J., concurring & Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia, in arguing for 
the coerced loan approach, noted that the Court has assumed market competitiveness in the Chapter 11 
context. Id. at 492, 499 (Scalia, J., dissenting). However, the dissent makes no further mention of non-
Chapter 13 bankruptcies. 
117  Id. at 485–91 (Thomas, J., concurring). Section 1325(a)(5)(B)(ii) is the Chapter 13 equivalent to 
Chapter 11’s § 1129. Compare 11 U.S.C. § 1325 (a)(5)(B)(ii) (2006), with id. § 1129. 
118  See Elson, supra note 42, at 1936–39. 
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C. Current Interpretation of Till 
Even with the evidentiary suggestion in Till’s footnote fourteen, courts 
continue to struggle with determining Chapter 11 cramdown interest rates 
and defining what constitutes an “efficient market.”119 Some courts purport 
to utilize an efficient market approach, while others continue to rely on 
Till’s formula approach.120 
Although courts have yet to reach a Chapter 11 cramdown 
consensus,121 several cases show that there is a growing trend toward the 
efficient market approach.122 In Bank of Montreal v. Official Committee of 
Unsecured Creditors (In re American Homepatient, Inc.), the Sixth Circuit 
squarely addressed the issue of applying Till in the Chapter 11 context.123 
Recognizing what Till’s footnote suggested, the Sixth Circuit articulated an 
efficient market approach124 and held that “the market rate should be applied 
in Chapter 11 cases where there exists an efficient market.”125 When no 
efficient market exists for a loan to a Chapter 11 debtor-in-possession, “the 
bankruptcy court should employ the formula approach endorsed by the Till 
plurality.”126 
In Mercury Capital Corp. v. Milford Connecticut Associates, L.P., the 
district court held that “the [b]ankruptcy [c]ourt did not necessarily err as a 
matter of law” in applying the Till plurality’s formula rate approach to a 
 
119  See Fawkes & Hartmann, supra note 46, at 28–29, 66. At least one court that has examined 
cramdown interest rates post-Till has concluded Till does not apply in a Chapter 11 context. See In re 
Prussia Assocs., 322 B.R. 572, 585 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 2005) (“Till is instructive, but it is not controlling, 
insofar as mandating the use of the ‘formula’ approach described in Till in every Chapter 11 case.”). 
However, several commentators have argued that Chapter 11 cases are not quite as dissimilar to Chapter 
13 cases as the Till Court assumed, in which case the Till formula approach could also apply to Chapter 
11 cases. See 7 COLLIER, supra note 16, ¶ 1129.05[2][c], at 1129-148 to -149. 
120  A number of post-Till Chapter 11 cases have relied on the formula approach to determine an 
appropriate cramdown. See In re Mendoza, No. 09-11678, 2010 WL 1610120, at *2 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 
Apr. 20, 2010); In re Field, No. 04-00028-TLM, 2005 WL 3148287, at *4‒6 (Bankr. D. Idaho Oct. 17, 
2005); In re Deep River Warehouse, Inc., No. 04-52749, 2005 WL 2319201, at *9‒11 (Bankr. M.D.N.C. 
Sept. 22, 2005). Other courts have simply assumed that the prepetition contract rate is also the efficient 
market rate, without evidence to support a conclusion that such an equation is fair and reasonable under 
the circumstances. See Interim Capital, LLC v. Hank’s Dock, Inc. (In re Seaspan Dev. Corp.), Nos. 04-
21339, 04-21340, 2:05-CV-315, 2006 WL 2672298, at *1‒4 (E.D. Tenn. Sept. 18, 2006); In re Sylvan I-
30 Enters., No. 05–86708–HDH–11, 2006 WL 2539718, at *7 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. Sept. 1, 2006). 
121  See 7 COLLIER, supra note 16, ¶ 1129.05[2][c], at 1129-149 to -151. 
122  See id. at 1129-150 to -151. The efficient market approach is also known as the hybrid formula 
approach and the two terms can be used interchangeably. 
123  420 F.3d 559 (6th Cir. 2005). 
124  See id. at 567–68; see also infra Part IV. 
125  Am. Homepatient, 420 F.3d at 568. In an analysis of the American Homepatient decision, 
commentators have argued that the Sixth Circuit essentially relied on a coerced loan approach in setting 
the interest rate on a partially secured cramdown loan based on the type of loan at issue. See Robert 
Goodrich & Madison Martin, Emptying the “Till”: The Sixth Circuit Sequel, NORTON BANKR. L. 
ADVISER, June 2006, available at 2006 No. 06 Norton Bankr. L. Adviser 1. 
126  Am. Homepatient, 420 F.3d at 568. 
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Chapter 11 context.127 However, the district court vacated the decision and 
remanded the case due to insufficient evidence in the record to determine if 
an efficient market rate existed for the type of loan contemplated by the 
plan.128 Additionally, the court noted that the debtor’s plan did not apply the 
Till formula correctly because the record lacked any evidence as to the 
national prime rate, which is the baseline rate of Till’s formula approach.129 
In another case concerning the proper Chapter 11 cramdown interest 
rate, the court in In re Northwest Timberline Enterprises, Inc.130 adopted the 
Till formula approach after it found that there was no “efficient market” for 
loans identical to what was being offered by the secured creditor. The court 
approved a 13.75% discount rate, adding a 5.75% risk adjustment to the 8% 
prime rate.131 
These decisions demonstrate that courts will focus on whether an 
efficient lending market exists before applying a formula rate to determine 
the proper Chapter 11 cramdown interest rate. Yet whether this is the most 
rational approach to the problem is debatable. The next Part will further 
explore the efficient market approach and methods of defining an “efficient 
market.” 
IV. THE EFFICIENT MARKET APPROACH 
Under the efficient market approach as applied by In re American 
Homepatient, the courts will first conduct an “efficient market” analysis and 
determine whether there is an applicable market rate that can fairly 
compensate a creditor for its exposure.132 An obvious possible advantage is 
that an efficient market rate of interest may accurately capture the present 
value of the secured claim, thus fulfilling the fair-and-equitable requirement 
of the cramdown provisions.133 More importantly, the efficient market 
approach can adequately protect the lender from being 
undercompensated.134 In the current economic downturn, it can be argued 
that greater emphasis should be placed on preserving the rights of creditors 
and ensuring their proper compensation. To provide adequate relief and 
 
127  354 B.R. 1, 4 (D. Conn. 2006). 
128  Id. at 12‒13. 
129  Id. at 13. 
130  348 B.R. 412, 434 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2006). 
131  Id. 
132  See 420 F.3d 559 (6th Cir. 2005). 
133  See GMAC v. Jones, 999 F.2d 63, 69 (3d Cir. 1993). The efficient market rate of interest will 
also reduce concerns that the creditor is undercompensated during the bankruptcy proceeding. Id. 
134  See In re Smith, 178 B.R. 946, 955–56 (Bankr. D. Vt. 1995) (“In a perfect bankruptcy world, a 
debtor-in-possession and a creditor would come to agreement on the perfect discount rate for every 
creditor’s claim in bankruptcy. That is, they would arrive at a claim position that allows a debtor to 
survive and a creditor to earn an appropriate return on the claim in any future interest rate 
environment.” (emphasis added)). 
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prevent further impairment of lenders and the vulnerable lending market, 
courts, when possible, should apply a market rate approach for Chapter 11 
cramdown situations.135 However, what is an “efficient market” and when 
does one exist? 
The remainder of this Part will explore the meaning of an efficient 
market. First, it will provide an overview of what constitutes an efficient 
market and its connection with debtor-in-possession financing. Then, it will 
provide a quick summary of debtor-in-possession financing before 
continuing with a discussion of why the availability of debtor-in-possession 
financing should not equate to the existence of an “efficient market.” 
A. Defining an Efficient Market 
An efficient market should reveal what a debtor and a creditor, both 
having reasonable knowledge of relevant facts, are willing to agree upon. 
Although Till did not define the term “efficient market,” the term has 
appeared quite frequently in other areas of law, especially securities 
litigation. In the context of securities fraud, “an efficient market is one in 
which market price fully reflects all publicly available information.”136 The 
efficient market is based on the assumptions that: “(1) all investors have 
costless access to currently available information about the future; (2) all 
investors are good analysts; and (3) all investors pay close attention to 
market prices and adjust their holdings appropriately.”137 One can infer that 
availability of material information is the key ingredient for defining an 
efficient market in securities litigation. However, whether bankruptcy 
courts will adopt this definition is yet to be determined. 
 
135  See Lehman Brothers, Sharper Image, Bennigan’s and Beyond: Is Chapter 11 Bankruptcy 
Working?: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Commercial & Admin. Law of the H. Comm. on the 
Judiciary, 110th Cong 10–17 (2008) (statement of Jay Lawrence Westbrook, Benno C. Schmidt Chair of 
Business Law, Univ. of Tex. Sch. of Law) (discussing recent bankruptcies and the lending market’s 
exposure). 
136  Bowe v. PolyMedica Corp. (In re PolyMedica Corp. Sec. Litig.), 432 F.3d 1, 10 (1st Cir. 2005) 
(citing Lynn A. Stout, The Mechanisms of Market Inefficiency: An Introduction to the New Finance, 
28 J. CORP. L. 635, 639 (2003) (“[T]he common definition of market efficiency . . . is really a shorthand 
for the empirical claim that ‘available information’ does not support profitable trading strategies or 
arbitrage opportunities.”)); see also Greenberg v. Crossroads Sys., Inc., 364 F.3d 657, 661 n.6 (5th Cir. 
2004) (“[W]here securities are traded in an efficient market, it is assumed that all public information 
concerning a company is known to the market and reflected in the market price of the company’s 
stock.”); GFL Advantage Fund, Ltd. v. Colkitt, 272 F.3d 189, 208 (3d. Cir. 2001) (defining “efficient 
marketplace” as one “in which stock prices reflect all available relevant information about the stock’s 
economic value”); Joseph v. Wiles, 223 F.3d 1155, 1163 n.2 (10th Cir. 2000) (stating that in an efficient 
market, “the investor must rely on the market to perform a valuation process which incorporates all 
publicly available information, including misinformation”). 
137  Jonathan R. Macey et al., Lessons from Financial Economics: Materiality, Reliance, and 
Extending the Reach of Basic v. Levinson, 77 VA. L. REV. 1017, 1022 (1991) (quoting G. ALEXANDER 
& W. SHARPE, FUNDAMENTALS OF INVESTMENTS 67 (1989)). 
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Rather, we can look back at Till for some guidance on defining market 
efficiency in the bankruptcy context. In Till, the Court acknowledged that 
“there is no readily apparent Chapter 13 cramdown market rate of interest: 
Because every cramdown loan is imposed by a court over the objection of 
the secured creditor, there is no free market of willing cramdown 
lenders.”138 The Court then noted that this is not necessarily true for Chapter 
11 debtors-in-possession seeking financing. As the plurality in Till 
recognized, “[N]umerous lenders advertise financing for Chapter 11 debtors 
in possession.”139 This suggests that the wide availability of debtor-in-
possession financing may be sufficient to establish an efficient market for 
Chapter 11 situations. However, many believe “the Till plurality’s footnote 
discussion of Chapter 11 [represents] a misunderstanding of the nature of 
[debtor-in-possession] financing.”140 To consider this contention, we must 
further explore the concept of debtor-in-possession financing. 
B. Debtor-in-Possession Financing 
Debtor-in-possession financing is typically “a relatively short-term, 
restrictive loan that contains more stringent covenants and features higher 
interest rates and fees.”141 More often than not, it is the existing lender that 
provides some of the loan or the entire loan to the debtor-in-possession.142 
This form of financing can be highly profitable for lenders such as financial 
 
138  Till v. SCS Credit Corp., 541 U.S. 465, 476 n.14 (2004) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
139  Id. 
140  The Great Debates Resolved: The Till Rate of Interest Is Applicable in Chapter 11 Cases (Am. 
Bankr. Inst. 30th Annual Midwestern Bankr. Inst.), 2010, at 252, available at http://www.abiworld.org/
committees/newsletters/busreorg/vol9num10/till.pdf; see 7 COLLIER, supra note 16, ¶ 1129.05[2][c][i], 
at 1129-148 to -149. 
141  George W. Kuney, Hijacking Chapter 11, 21 EMORY BANKR. DEV. J. 19, 50 (2004); see also id. 
at 50‒56 (discussing the nature of, and common covenants that are associated with, debtor-in-possession 
(DIP) financing loans). Debtor-in-possession financing is generally used to fund operating activities 
during Chapter 11 bankruptcy. Lenders generally require “the debtor [to] use the proceeds specifically 
as working capital, for general corporate purposes, allowed operating expenses, or a specific real estate 
development or acquisition.” Id. at 51‒52 (footnotes omitted). Additionally, most debtor-in-possession 
financing loans are typically in the form of a revolving credit agreement utilizing inventory or accounts 
receivable as the primary collateral. Id. at 51. A revolving credit agreement is generally a type of loan in 
which the bank promises to lend the borrower up to a specific maximum amount during a specified time 
period. See Glossary of Economic Terms, FED. RESERVE BANK OF S.F., http://www.frbsf.org/tools/
glossary/index.html (search “open-end credit”) (last visited June 17, 2012). 
142  U.S. statistics suggest that the existing lender provides some or all of the debtor-in-possession 
loan in 58% of Chapter 11 cases. Sandeep Dahiya et al., Debtor-in-Possession Financing and 
Bankruptcy Resolution: Empirical Evidence, 69 J. FIN. ECON. 259, 265 (2003). Additionally, DIP 
financing tends to increase a firm’s chances of emerging successfully from Chapter 11 bankruptcy based 
on a sample taken from all Chapter 11 cases filed. Id. at 273; see also Kenneth M. Ayotte & Edward R. 
Morrison, Creditor Control and Conflict in Chapter 11, 1 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 511, 524 (2009) (finding 
that 50% of firms in a sample of firms in Chapter 11 bankruptcy obtained DIP financing and that 54% of 
those obtained financing from a preexisting creditor). 
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institutions, hedge funds, and private equity firms.143 Generally, the rates of 
interest and loan fees charged on debtor-in-possession financing are higher 
than traditional loans, presumably to offset the risk of lending to an 
insolvent company that may not emerge from bankruptcy.144 
One important feature of debtor-in-possession financing is that the loan 
is almost always secured. Most of the time, it is secured by all of the 
corporation’s assets.145 Accordingly, it follows that a judge can look to the 
interest rate of the debtor-in-possession financing loan to determine the 
cramdown of the creditor’s collateral. 
In regard to lending practices for debtor-in-possession financing, it is 
clear that lenders are willing to lend to bankrupt corporations under Chapter 
11.146 In 2008, debtor-in-possession financing was at a five-year record 
high, totaling approximately $18.1 billion.147 This marked a 33% increase 
from 2007, and the market is expected to continue to grow.148 Moreover, a 
number of papers have acknowledged the ubiquity of debtor-in-possession 
financing during the 1990s.149 
C. Concerns Regarding the Efficient Market Approach and Debtor-in-
Possession Financing 
Although it appears that there is indeed a readily available debtor-in-
possession financing market, there are several reasons why it should not be 
used to determine a proper efficient market cramdown rate. 
 
143  Mark Schrager, Financing the Insolvent Company—An Overview 14–16 (Aug. 2006), available 
at http://www.dwpv.com/images/Financing_the_Insolvent_Company_-_An_Overview.pdf. 
144  Id. The higher rates of interest and loan fees reflect a risk premium due to the nature of the 
debtor-in-possession. Id. at 14. 
145  See Ayotte & Morrison, supra note 142, at 522‒24 (finding that 92% of DIP loans are secured 
by all of the debtor corporation’s assets). 
146  See David W. Marston, DIP Financing Issues and Alternatives, GIBBONS (Apr. 7, 2009), 
http://www.gibbonslaw.com/news_publications/articles.php?action=display_publication&publication_id
=2734 (“We never lost one penny in Chapter 11 financings in all of those years.” (quoting Sterling 
Chairman Louis Cappelli)); see also Michelle J. White, Economics of Corporate and Personal 
Bankruptcy Law, in THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS 4–9 (2d ed. 2008). 
The efficient market approach is not likely to be applicable for Chapter 13 individual debtors. 
Presumably, individuals have significantly less nonexempt assets available as collateral to securitize 
new loans. This ultimately reduces the attractiveness of lending to individuals. While individuals can file 
bankruptcy under Chapter 11, that is beyond the scope of this paper. In this Comment, I primarily focus 
on corporations filing under Chapter 11. 
147  See Stephen A. Donato & Thomas L. Kennedy, Trends in DIP Financing: Not as Bad as It 
Seems?, J CORP. RENEWAL, Sept./Oct. 2009, at 4, 5, available at http://www.turnaround.org/
Publications/Articles.aspx?objectId=11602 (“DIP loans traditionally were viewed as safe and profitable 
for lenders and were almost taken for granted by many potential debtors.”). 
148  Id. 
149  See Ayotte & Morrison, supra note 142, at 515 (surveying research). 
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The first reason is associated with the idea that a relevant efficient 
market for Chapter 11 loans “may be just as illusory as in chapter 13.”150 
This argument takes aim at what it suggests is an “inapt and unstated 
inference the Court makes with respect to the similarity between the interest 
rates applicable to [debtor-in-possession] financing and the interest rates 
applicable to loans imposed upon dissenting creditors at cramdown.”151 
Debtor-in-possession financing generally occurs at the beginning of a 
bankruptcy case, whereas the determination of a Chapter 11 cramdown rate 
under § 1129(b)(2) occurs at confirmation.152 Therefore, given the 
differences in timing, there are generally more risks associated with the 
lending when a debtor-in-possession seeks financing than when a debtor-in-
possession seeks a cramdown confirmation.153 An appropriate Chapter 11 
cramdown rate should be less than the rate offered to a debtor-in-possession 
seeking financing. 
The second reason is the fear that bankruptcy lenders may charge 
excessive rates in an efficient market. Bankruptcy lenders, such as debtor-
in-possession financing lenders, can take advantage of the debtor-in-
possession’s need for interim financing, thus forcing the debtor-in-
possession to “obtain credit in order to save [itself] from liquidation and 
often ha[s] little negotiating leverage.”154 One commentator has stated that 
while debtor-in-possession financing loans “may in fact be very low risk 
credits, . . . they are [in reality] priced as very high risk credits.”155 The 
argument is that debtor-in-possession financing markets present excessive 
rates, are unlike normal credit markets, and do not reflect an efficient 
market.156 
Under these circumstances, it does not make sense for a court to look 
toward debtor-in-possession financing to establish an efficient market. 
“Equating the availability of [debtor-in-possession] financing with the 
existence of an ‘efficient market’ for secured exit financing seems quite a 
stretch. The ‘market’ for [debtor-in-possession] loans is not like regular 
credit markets and not like the markets for exit financing.”157 
 
150  7 COLLIER, supra note 16, ¶ 1129.05[2][c][i], at 1129-148. 
151  Id. 
152  See id. 
153  Id. at 1129-148 to -149 (“Thus, instead of the interim and inherently more uncertain risk present 
in debtor in possession financing, the court at confirmation is presented with a less risky, more stable 
and restructured debtor; the fact that the debtor is more stable is bound up in the court’s necessary 
feasibility determination under section 1129(a)(11).”). 
154  Adam Strochak, A Cram Session on Cramdown Interest Rates, WEIL BANKR. BLOG (June 22, 
2011), http://business-finance-restructuring.weil.com/chapter-11-plans/a-cram-session-on-cramdown-
interest-rates/#axzz1mReC6f54. 
155  Id. 
156  However, one could argue that the lending market is competitive, and presumably the economics 
of supply and demand will regulate any possibilities of excessive rates. 
157  Strochak, supra note 154. 
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If not the market for debtor-in-possession financing, then what should 
courts look to in establishing an efficient market rate? One possible 
alternative would be to equate an efficient market with any comparable 
market loan, as is done in the coerced loan approach. However, this 
approach is not without its own problems. There may not always be an 
actual efficient market for a particular cramdown loan.158 A particular 
comparable loan may not be available for many reasons, including the 
tightening of the credit market or the lack of any comparable business 
structured in the same manner as the debtor.159 One commentator believes 
“[t]here is no more of a ‘free market of willing cramdown lenders’ in a 
chapter 11 . . . than in a chapter 13.”160 If there is a lending market, then 
“there is no need to resort to a cramdown provision.”161 Other possible 
problems associated with this interpretation of an efficient market may be 
traced to the problems found in the coerced loan approach as discussed 
above, which include (1) the loan proposed is “so outrageous that no 
rational lender would make [a similar loan]”162 or (2) “the market may have 
shrunk for loans of the type proposed.”163 
Ultimately, the problem with the efficient market approach is the 
elusive definition of an efficient market. There does not appear to be a clear 
answer. Regrettably, “[t]he definition of an efficient market has not been 
directly addressed by a post-Till case.”164 Several of the post-Till cases 
mentioned above exhibit instances of how difficult it is to find an applicable 
efficient market rate.165 The party attempting to establish the efficient 
market rate “is left to speculate what evidentiary considerations will be 
required to establish an efficient market and what this evidentiary endeavor 
will cost.”166 
It is ultimately up to the bankruptcy judge to weigh the evidence and 
determine whether an efficient market exists. Where there is no actual 
efficient market, there is, of course, no applicable efficient market interest 
 
158  See Bank of Montreal v. Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors (In re Am. Homepatient, Inc.), 
420 F.3d 559, 567‒68 (6th Cir. 2005). 
159  See In re Jordan, 130 B.R. 185, 189 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1991) (“[A]s Judge Lundin articulated in the 
chapter 11 context in In re Aztec Company . . . it is difficult to arrive at a current market rate of interest 
for a hypothetical new loan when there is no market for the loan proposed, no equity in the property and 
limited opportunity on the part of the debtor to obtain financing outside of the Bankruptcy Code 
framework.”). 
160  Thomas J. Yerbich, How Do You Count the Votes—Or Did Till Tilt the Game?, AM. BANKR. 
INST. J., July/Aug. 2004, at 10, 59. 
161  Id. 
162  7 COLLIER, supra note 16, ¶ 1129.05[2][c][ii][B], at 1129-152. 
163  Id. 
164  Pill, supra note 3, at 290. 
165  See supra Part III.C. 
166  Pill, supra note 3, at 288‒89. 
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rate. It seems that courts and practitioners alike will continue to wrestle 
with the proper definition of efficient market. 
V. THE CONTRACT RATE APPROACH—A BETTER WAY 
This Comment argues that there is a better way to determine an 
appropriate Chapter 11 cramdown rate. Namely, the court should apply a 
contract rate approach by looking at the interest rate of the original 
agreement between the parties, rather than applying Till’s formula approach 
or the efficient market approach. 
Under the contract rate approach, courts apply the prepetition contract 
rate on the presumption that the prebankruptcy contract interest rate on the 
loan is an accurate reflection of the lending market.167 The contract rate “is 
generally a good indicator of actual risk, . . . and it will provide a quick and 
reasonably accurate standard”168 for determining a cramdown rate. To be 
clear, the contract rate approach differs from the aforementioned 
presumptive contract approach in that it will not allow the parties to rebut 
the negotiated contract rate. One principal reason why the contract rate 
approach does not include a rebuttal element is the significant evidentiary 
burden (including discovery) and cost associated with rebuttal. As 
suggested by Till’s plurality, the debtor-in-possession must spend 
considerable resources to obtain sufficient information, such as the 
creditor’s overhead costs and lending practices, to rebut the presumptive 
contract rate.169 In addition, another difficulty is in establishing a clear 
standard for the rebuttal, which is beyond the scope of this Comment. Even 
then, I question how much information is needed to persuade the court to 
rebut the presumptive contract rate. 
Applying a contract rate approach raises various obvious questions, 
namely, why not stick with Till’s formula approach or the efficient market 
approach? The Supreme Court adopted the formula approach, so is the 
contract rate approach inconsistent with the Court’s mandate? Why should 
the courts apply the contract rate approach over the formula and efficient 
market approaches? 
As I argued above, Till’s plurality opinion is not binding on lower 
courts in regard to Chapter 11 cramdown situations.170 Other than the 
Justices who joined the plurality opinion, no Justice discussed the 
applicability of Till to Chapter 11 cramdown situations. The plurality did 
suggest that an efficient market analysis should apply to Chapter 11 
cramdowns,171 but it failed to provide a workable definition of efficient 
 
167  See supra Part II.C. 
168  Till v. SCS Credit Corp., 541 U.S. 465, 492 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
169  Id. at 478 (plurality opinion). 
170  See supra Part III.B. There should be no doubt that Till is binding on Chapter 13 debtors. 
171  See Till, 541 U.S. at 476 n.14. 
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market. Justice Stevens, writing for the plurality, did point to the 
availability of debtor-in-possession financing as evidence of a “free market 
of willing cramdown lenders.”172 However, as discussed above, there are 
several reasons why the debtor-in-possession financing market is not 
necessarily an appropriate efficient market for cramdown purposes.173 
Consequently, the efficient market approach offers no solution to the 
Chapter 11 cramdown dilemma. 
Accordingly, we must address the issue of why the contract rate 
approach is preferable to the formula and efficient market approaches. The 
proposed contract rate approach is superior for three reasons. First, the 
contract rate approach best protects the justified expectations of the parties. 
Second, the basic policies and interests underlying the laws of Chapter 11 
and Chapter 13 bankruptcies are different. Bankrupt corporations (Chapter 
11) are not the same as bankrupt individuals (Chapter 13). Considering the 
various interests of a Chapter 11 corporation, there are strong arguments 
why a contract rate approach is more suitable. Third, both the formula and 
the efficient market approaches are excessively complicated, requiring risk 
premium calculations and efficient market determinations. The contract rate 
approach is easier to manage and creates consistent, predictable outcomes. 
A. Justified Expectations of the Parties 
Applying a contract rate approach will protect the justified 
expectations of both the creditor and debtor-in-possession. Generally, “it 
would be unfair and improper” to hold the creditor to a new interest rate 
“when he had justifiably molded his conduct to conform” to the demands of 
a competitive lending market.174 Parties enter a transaction with the 
expectation that each side will satisfy their duties and obligations, and 
creditors expect a certain amount of compensation from their loans.175 A 
desire to protect justified expectations is one key factor underlying the 
relatively broad freedom the law gives contracting parties to choose what 
type of debt they wish to incur.176 
Without protection of their justified expectations, parties are likely to 
change their borrowing and lending behaviors, which would create a ripple 
 
172  Id. 
173  See supra Part IV.C. 
174  1 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 6 cmt. g (1971) (noting that the 
“[p]rotection of justified expectations . . . is an important value in all fields of the law” (emphasis 
omitted)). 
175  Likewise, it can be argued that creditors know, or should know, that their loans may be rewritten 
in bankruptcy. However, whether the creditor accounts for this risk is uncertain. 
176  Cf. KERMIT ROOSEVELT, III, CONFLICT OF LAWS 82 (2010) (listing protection of the justified 
expectations of the parties as a relevant factor in the choice of law determination for contracts issues); 
see also Paul L. Regan, Great Expectations? A Contract Law Analysis for Preclusive Corporate Lock-
Ups, 21 CARDOZO L. REV. 1, 33 (1999) (“The principal purpose of contract law is to protect the justified 
expectations that arise from promises underlying bargains.”). 
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effect throughout the economy.177 For example, if cramdown creditors are 
“systematically undercompensated,” lenders will offset their losses with 
higher rates or simply decline to lend money to the riskiest debtors.178 Such 
an arrangement would, of course, be suboptimal. The recent credit crunch 
serves as a concrete illustration of the importance of credit availability. 
Restricting access to credit ultimately decreases the amount of investment 
in business, education, and housing—all vital components of the greater 
public interest of economic growth. Protecting justified expectations and 
applying a contract rate approach would ensure that lenders are adequately 
protected, enhancing the lending market and potentially resulting in lower 
interest rates.179 
B. Underlying Policies and Interests of Bankruptcy 
An assessment of the policies and interests underlying Chapter 11 
bankruptcy proceedings justifies choosing a contract rate approach. The 
fundamental goals of Chapter 11 bankruptcies are to provide a fresh start 
and to protect the rights of creditors.180 However, in the Chapter 11 context, 
it is debatable whether a debtor-in-possession’s fresh start is more 
important than the rights of creditors.181 
In Till, the Court, in supporting the formula approach, focused on the 
debtor’s fresh start and minimizing costs in Chapter 13 cases. Most Chapter 
13 debtors or individuals can ill afford to handle costly disputes.182 
Individual debtors are also not as well versed in the legal and financial 
ramifications of bankruptcy.183 These rationales, although still present in 
some Chapter 11 bankruptcies, are certainly not a main concern in larger 
Chapter 11 cases.184 Corporations (filing under Chapter 11) tend to have 
more resources, such as legal and finance departments, that allow them to 
obtain better knowledge and an understanding of the potential risks 
 
177  See Till, 541 U.S. at 508 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
178  Id. 
179  This section presents a strong argument against applying an efficient market rate, which may 
produce a new cramdown interest rate that neither party expected prepetition. 
180  See 7 COLLIER, supra note 16, ¶ 1100.01, at 1100-4. 
181  See Ralph Brubaker, Taking Exception to the New Corporate Discharge Exceptions, 13 AM. 
BANKR. INST. L. REV. 757, 760‒61 (2005) (discussing why giving the corporate debtor a “fresh start” 
might not be the principal policy concern in Chapter 11 bankruptcies). 
182  See 7 COLLIER, supra note 16, ¶ 1129.05[2][c][i]. 
183  Chapter 13 debtors are assigned a Chapter 13 trustee. The trustee is considered the representative 
of the Chapter 13 estate. In United States trustee districts, the United States trustee, rather than the court, 
makes the appointment of an individual to serve as standing Chapter 13 trustee, or as trustee in a 
particular case, or else the United States trustee may serve as the Chapter 13 trustee. See 11 U.S.C. § 323 
(2006); 28 U.S.C. § 586 (2006). 
184  See 7 COLLIER, supra note 16, ¶ 1129.05[2][c][i], at 1129-148 (“[The cost-minimizing] 
rationale, while not absent from chapter 11 cases, is certainly minimized in larger chapter 11 cases.”). 
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associated with debt.185 For instance, a Chapter 11 corporation is arguably 
better at understanding the consequences of negotiating a subprime 
mortgage with high variable rates—and therefore needs less protection—
than a Chapter 13 individual debtor. 
It would be unjustified to treat Chapter 11 debtors-in-possession the 
same as Chapter 13 debtors. The contract rate approach does not, per se, tilt 
the balance in favor of the debtor or creditor. Rather, it seeks to preserve the 
equitable balance between debtors and creditors that existed prior to 
bankruptcy. 
C. Ease of Management, Uniformity, and Predictability 
Ease of management, uniformity, and predictability are values 
desirable across a wide range of legal fields.186 Bankruptcy law is no 
exception. It is important that good rules be developed to reaffirm these 
values. A contract rate approach is simply more straightforward than the 
formula and efficient market approaches because it is easier to apply and 
more objective. As Justice Scalia stated in his Till dissent, a contract rate 
provides a good indication of the actual risk of default in the particular 
case.187 The cramdown rate is already predetermined by the contract rate, “a 
number readily found in the loan document.”188 Moreover, a contract rate 
approach would make the cramdown process more objective and uniform 
by eliminating the subjective elements found in both the formula approach 
and the efficient market approach.189 Courts will no longer have to ponder 
whether, for example, a 1% or 4% risk adjustment is adequate and feasible 
for the debtor.190 The parties will also no longer have to wait and wonder 
how the bankruptcy court will rule concerning the existence of an efficient 
market. Additionally, the predictability afforded by the contract rate 
approach will lower lending risks and enable lenders to appropriately 
evaluate the debt market. 
Finally, another potential benefit of using the contract rate approach is 
a reduction of the number and complexity of evidentiary hearings and 
 
185  I imagine corporate bankruptcies tend to implicate larger concerns of economic welfare, such as 
productivity and market stability, whereas individual bankruptcies often highlight social policies such as 
the prevention of homelessness and the protection of the common person. 
186  See ROOSEVELT, supra note 176, at 82. 
187  See Till v. SCS Credit Corp., 541 U.S. 465, 492 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
188  Id. at 499. 
189  See Greenspan & Nelson, supra note 36, at 70 (arguing that although the factors the Till plurality 
used to find the appropriate formula approach risk adjustment are arguably objectively observable in the 
market, it nonetheless “takes subjective professional judgment to apply [them] to each debtor’s 
circumstances”). 
190  See id. (“[I]n noting that courts ‘have generally approved 1‒3 percent’ as the proper risk 
adjustment, Till will inevitably, and perhaps inappropriately, frame discussions as to the range of this 
adjustment.” (citations omitted) (quoting Till, 541 U.S. at 480 (plurality opinion))). 
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expensive discovery associated with the formula and efficient market 
approaches.191 
CONCLUSION 
This Comment has attempted to shed light on the difficulty of choosing 
an appropriate cramdown interest rate to apply to a creditor’s claim in the 
Chapter 11 context. With the Supreme Court’s decision in Till v. SCS 
Credit Corp. serving as a backdrop, courts are still struggling to reach a 
consensus in Chapter 11 cases. The Till Court described the many benefits 
and problems with each approach,192 but ultimately decided on the formula 
approach as the appropriate method for determining the cramdown rate for 
secured claims in Chapter 13. 
The import of Till’s holding to Chapter 11 cases is not yet clear. 
Although Till’s plurality hinted at a desire for uniformity among various 
chapters of the Bankruptcy Code,193 footnote fourteen of the opinion has 
caused confusion for practitioners, litigants, and courts alike. Both because 
Till’s reasoning did not garner a majority and because of the peculiarities of 
footnote fourteen, one is left to wonder whether even a majority of the Till 
Court would apply its holding to Chapter 11. 
Since Till, some courts have applied Till’s formula approach,194 
whereas other courts have found footnote fourteen persuasive and have 
created new approaches to take into account the possibility of an efficient 
market analysis.195 To address the issue of which approach should be used 
in Chapter 11 cases, this Comment has advocated the implementation of 
neither the formula nor efficient market approaches, but, instead, a contract 
rate approach. 
This Comment has established that the contract rate approach is 
superior for several reasons. First, the contract will allow the court to apply 
an objective approach that can eliminate the uncertainty involved in 
establishing a risk premium under the formula approach or an efficient 
market under the efficient market approach. Second, this Comment has 
showed that the contract rate approach protects the justified expectations of 
 
191  Cf. In re Collins, 167 B.R. 842, 847 (Bankr. E.D. Tex. 1994) (“Determination of an appropriate 
rate is a difficult question because unlike a lending institution, this Court does not have a lending manual 
which mechanically guides this analysis.”). Moreover, a debtor-in-possession attempting to establish an 
efficient market has the burden of obtaining information on the creditor’s lending practice, costs of 
overhead, financial circumstances, and more. See Pill, supra note 3, at 188‒89. 
192  See Till, 541 U.S. 465. A reading of Till suggests a lack of satisfactory reasoning for any of the 
many approaches suggested. 
193  E.g., id. at 474 (“Congress intended bankruptcy judges and trustees to follow essentially the 
same approach when choosing an appropriate interest rate under any of these provisions.”). 
194  See In re Prussia Assocs., 322 B.R. 572, 590 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 2005). 
195  See Bank of Montreal v. Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors (In re Am. Homepatient, Inc.), 
420 F.3d 559, 568 (6th Cir. 2005); Mercury Capital Corp. v. Milford Conn. Assocs., L.P., 354 B.R. 1, 13 
(D. Conn. 2006); In re Nw. Timberline Enters., Inc., 348 B.R. 412, 432 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2006). 
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the parties and the underlying policies of the Bankruptcy Code. And finally, 
the contract rate approach is easier to manage and instills predictability and 
uniformity in an area of law that has generally lacked both. As a whole, the 
benefits of the contract rate approach outweigh those of all the other 
alternatives. For these reasons, courts should adopt the contract rate 
approach when dealing with Chapter 11 cramdowns. 
